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Introduction
In January 1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations
established a Commission on Atomic Energy charged with making
proposals, among other things, on "the control of atomic energy to
ensure its use for peaceful purposes" and on "nuclear disarmament,
subject to international safeguards." I The cold war soon brought the
work of the Commission to a halt, since that time the only major
accomplishment in curbing the development and use of nuclear
weapons has been the limited nuclear test ban treaty of 1963.2
Since 1963, the central and continuing arms control effort by the
U.S. Government has been to achieve agreement on a treaty whereby
nations already possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to
transfer, and nations not possessing nuclear weapons would agree not
to manufacture or otherwise acquire, such weapons in the future. This
subject has been under negotiation in the Eighteen Nation Disarma-
ment Committee of the United Nations, meeting in Geneva.
Closely related to nuclear disarmament is the problem of ensuring
that nuclear materials used, produced, and processed in civil nuclear
power programs are not diverted to any military use. Nuclear reactors
constructed for peaceful purposes also produce plutonium, a weapons
material. This is true whether the heat generated in the reactor is used
* Edited by William Mitchell from the 1966 report of the Committee on
International Control of Atomic Energy of the ABA Section of International
and Comparative Law.
1U.N. General Assembly Resolution RES (I)/ 1 (24 January 1946).
2 United National Treaty Series, Vol. 480. See Schwelb, "The Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty and International Law," 58 Am. Journal of International Law 642
(1964).
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for the production of electricity, for the desalination of sea water (as
may be true in the not too distant future), or for other purposes. One
medium-sized nuclear electric power plant produces the equivalent
of tens of Nagasaki-type weapons per year, and civil nuclear reactors
already built are producing the plutonium equivalent of hundreds of
nuclear weapons per year. By the year 1970, the worldwide produc-
tion rate for civil reactors will have increased to the equivalent of
thousands of bombs annually. Thus the need for a system of inter-
national accountability and control, or "international safeguards,"
covering the civil uses of nuclear materials is readily apparent.'
As to the health and safety aspects of peaceful nuclear activities,
the safety record of the nuclear industry is at least as good as that
of any other category of commercial enterprise. Nevertheless, there
is always the possibility-remote though this may be-of a nuclear
accident of catastrophic proportions. A power reactor cannot ex-
plode like an atomic bomb, but a series of failures in the built-in
safety systems, with melt-down of the core, generation of tremendous
heat, and possibly some chemical explosions, could conceivably
result in the spread of radioactivity into the atmosphere and into
ground waters, with very extensive damage." Obviously the general
public must be protected, in part at least, from the consequences of
such an accident. Furthermore, no private company could take the
risk, however remote, of incurring a liability of such magnitude and,
in many countries, encouraging the development of nuclear industry
is an established public policy. Accordingly a number of countries-
including the United States-have enacted legislation to place a
ceiling on the total liability for a particular nuclear accident and
to establish a system of financial protection, up to that limit, to
compensate those who suffer injury or damage.
In addition, a nuclear accident might have international implica-
tions. The release of radioactive material resulting from an accident
3 See Willrich, "Safeguarding Atoms for Peace," 60 Am. Journal of Inter-
national Law 34 (1966); Szasz, "Legal and Administrative Problems Arising
from the Implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency Safe-
guards," Progress in Nuclear Energy, Series X, Law and Administration, Vol.
4, p. 116 (1966).
4 In 1956 the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission arranged for a study of the
maximum damage that might result from a runaway power reactor (the so-
called "Brookhaven Report"). After resolving every uncertainty in the most
pessimistic way possible, the report described a hypothetical accident in which
3,400 people would be killed, 43,000 more would be injured, and there would
be property damages of $7 billion.
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in one country might cause damage in other countries. The designer,
builder, or suppliers of a nuclear power plant might be foreign to
the country in which the plant is operated. A nuclear accident
might occur during the course of international transportation, such
as the shipment of spent fuel elements from a reactor in one country
to a reprocessing plant in another country. Nuclear powered ships
are, and will be, operating on the high seas. Therefore it has been
thought desirable to prepare a number of international conventions
covering civil liability for nuclear damage.
Finally, national legislation regulating atomic energy activities
is necessary not only to meet internal requirements but to carry out
external responsibilities. While most of those countries in which
peaceful nuclear activities are fairly well advanced have already
adopted such legislation, a number of countries which are just enter-
ing the field have not yet done so. The International Atomic Energy
Agency has recently assisted in the preparation of such legislation
in the Philippines and it is hoped that the pattern of this legislation
may prove useful as a basis for similar laws in other countries.
I. The Problem of Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
The past year has witnessed some major developments in con-
nection with the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons, the
outcome of which cannot yet be predicted.
Until the past year, despite the facts that France and China had
exploded nuclear devices and that several other states had the capa-
bility of producing nuclear weapons, there was less sense of urgency
in obtaining agreement on measures which would limit or at least
slow down the development of weapons systems by states other
than the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. In the international negotiations
for arms control and disarmament it had been recognized since 1955
that the amounts of fissionable material produced by the Soviet
Union, United States, and United Kingdom had already become so
great that there was no longer a possibility of providing a verification
system which would give any assurance that all past production
had been accounted for. Therefore, the elimination of nuclear weap-
ons, an objective which had been paramount since the initial nego-
tiations in 1946 for the control of atomic energy, was no longer
realistic. Since 1955, the United States has therefore stressed the
necessity of measures which will prevent additional states from
developing nuclear weapons capabilities in the belief that the danger
of nuclear war increases as additional states obtain such capabilities.
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It has been the general belief that even though some states, such
as France and perhaps others, might have a few bombs, they are
many years away from developed weapons systems which could
upset the world balance of power. Technological developments since
1963 have made it possible to establish a fairly accurate timetable
on proliferation.
In 1964 the Jersey Central Power & Light Company entered into
an agreement with the General Electric Company for the construction
of a large power plant which would produce electric power at a lower
cost than was possible through the use of fossil fuels. This cost
breakthrough has resulted in a large number of projects, both in
the United States and abroad, for construction of atomic power plants.
The extent of the change in outlook is dramatically described in the
June 1, 1966, issue of Forbes Magazine:
From 1957 until last year, all the nuclear-powered generat-
ing plants built in the U.S. had a TOTAL capacity of less than 1
million kilowatts. Plants with a capacity of another 900,000
kilowatts were under construction. . . . Last year it all changed.
The public utilities ordered nuclear plants with a total capacity
of 4.7 million kilowatts. In the first three months of this year,
orders for nuclear plants ran to 3.5 million kilowatts. Orders
for fossil-fueled plants, in contrast, totaled only 3.2 million.
While the programs for development of nuclear power outside the
United States are moving more slowly, it has already become clear
that there will be many more power reactors abroad by 1975 than had
been anticipated as recently as 1964.
It must be emphasized that all of the power reactors provide plu-
tonium suitable for weapons. As long as the plutonium production
of power plants outside the nuclear powers was insignificant, the
problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons was not acute. How-
ever, with the existing schedule of construction, that situation will
come to an end sometime between 1975 and 1980 unless a system
for control of production of fissionable materials can be placed
in operation well before that period. In the absence of such a
system, the problem of preventing proliferation will be unsolvable.
This situation is analogous to that which confronted the United
States at the start of the atomic era. When Bernard Baruch made
his proposals for control of atomic energy he stated that unless agree-
ment could be obtained within a very short time, it would no longer
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be possible to account for past production of nuclear materials
by the great powers. As pointed out previously, this development
had materialized prior to 1955.
Probably as a result of this new sense of urgency in dealing with
the problem, a review has taken place within the U.S. Government
of previous positions on the type of verification machinery which
would be required to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Past U.S. and British studies had suggested that as many as 40,000
international inspectors might be required. It would obviously be
impossible to obtain Soviet consent to an international verification
organization of this size. A review of past positions apparently
disclosed that at least some degree of assurance against violation of
anti-proliferation agreements was obtainable with a verification or-
ganization requiring only a small fraction of the personnel suggested
in the earlier studies. A number of factors contributed to this result.
The earlier studies had assumed that an international inspection
agency would set up its own verification machinery in every nuclear
facility. This assumption overlooked the fact that a high degree
of accountability for the production of a nuclear facility is necessary
for the proper operation of the facility. The international verifica-
tion could, to a large extent, be based upon the plant's own system
of accountability.
Furthermore, nuclear facilities could be designed in a manner
to maximize the possibilities of accurate verification. Fortunately,
such designs in general tend to coincide with designs which were
commercially most advantageous. Finally, the possibility of a more
accurate accountability than had been previously visualized in the
types of facilities where it would be easiest to divert materials-
chemical processing plants and isotope separation plants-reduced
the inspection requirements for the remaining nuclear facilities.
While a relatively small international organization to insure veri-
fication of anti-proliferation agreements might not result in 100%
assurance of observance of commitments, nevertheless, the feeling
seems to be growing that agreements against proliferation with a
reasonably satisfactory, though not airtight, verification system are
preferable to the unlimited proliferation which would result if no arms
control agreements materialized.
Accordingly, in August and September 1965, the United States
and the Soviet Union both submitted to the Eighteen Nation Dis-
armament Committee (ENDC) draft treaties to prevent the spread
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of nuclear weapons. There were two main differences between the
treaties:
(1) The U.S. treaty contained a provision concerning safeguards
-"Each of the states party to this treaty undertakes to cooperate in
facilitating the application of IAEA or equivalent international safe-
guards on all peaceful nuclear activities." This U.S. proposal
clearly indicated the acceptance of a far less extensive verification
machinery than that visualized under previous proposals. The Soviet
treaty had no provision for verification.
(2) The Soviet draft treaty contained extensive and detailed
provisions to prevent transfer of nuclear weapons from the nuclear
powers to other states or groups of states. The U.S. treaty could
be interpreted to permit the United States to transfer the control
of nuclear weapons to a multi-lateral nuclear force related to NATO.
Amendments to the U.S. draft treaty submitted to the ENDC in
March 1966 apparently narrow greatly the differences between the
Soviet and the U.S. position on this second point. The Soviet initial
rejection of the U.S. amendments was on the purely propaganda
ground that the U.S. anti-proliferation treaty does not eliminate
existing stockpiles of weapons even though, in this respect, the U.S.
treaty and the Soviet treaty coincide. After reviewing more care-
fully the U.S. proposal, the Soviet Union continued to reject it
on the ground that even the new proposal did not prevent transfer
of control of nuclear weapons to a multi-lateral force related to
NATO.
It is suggested that the continued Soviet rejection of the U.S.
efforts to obtain agreement on an anti-proliferation program could
be either:
(1) A temporary holding operation while the Soviet government
reviews its position;
(2) A decision that the time is not yet ripe, possibly because of
Viet-Nam, for a further East-West detente even in an area where
there seems to be considerable community of interest between
U.S.S.R. and U.S.;
(3) A major Soviet shift in policy toward greater intransigence
than has prevailed since the death of Stalin.
These are only three of several possible interpretations of Soviet
attitudes. It should be pointed out that the recent U.S. proposal
is only one part of a larger program that would be required to
prevent proliferation. One further measure, of equal urgency, would
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be to extend the existing convention prohibiting nuclear testing in
the atmosphere, outer space, and the oceans to underground tests.
Neither the U.S. nor Soviet proposals prevent a state from developing
a nuclear weapons capability solely through its own resources.
Because of the accelerated proliferation timetable, we may ex-
pect more definite indications of the Soviet attitude in a relatively
short time.'
H. International Safeguards
Civil nuclear reactors are already producing plutonium in mili-
tarily significant quantities in several countries which do not yet
possess nuclear weapons.6 As stated above, the world-wide annual
plutonium production rate for civil nuclear reactors will have reached
the equivalent of thousands of crude fission bombs per year by 1970.
Therefore, unless comprehensive accountability and control of nuclear
materials in nations which do not already have nuclear weapons
is achieved in the near future, other efforts to prevent or retard the
spread of nuclear weapons capabilities will become meaningless.
Fortunately, various systems of internationally administered safe-
guards to ensure that the nuclear materials utilized in industrial pro-
grams are not diverted to any military purpose have been developed
and are being applied on an increasingly widespread basis. The
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) has safeguard
responsibilities with respect to civil nuclear energy programs in the
territory of the six members of the Community. The European Nu-
clear Energy Agency (ENEA), composed of members of the OECD
also administered safeguards on certain joint undertakings of its
members in the nuclear field. It is, however, the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), established in 1957 with a global mem-
bership, which offers in the long run the only practical organizational
approach to the accountability and control problem presented by
the growing use of nuclear energy as a source of electric power.
5 Editor's note: The discussions in the United Nations in the fall of 1966
suggest that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. may be approaching agreement.
6 Reactors used for the production of electricity, whether using natural
uranium or uranium slightly enriched in the isotope U285 as nuclear fuel,
produce plutonium. Some reactors used primarily for research in connection
with materials testing also may produce plutonium in significant quantities.
The type and size of reactor ordinarily used for university research does not
produce militarily important amounts of plutonium.
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Recent Milestones in the Development of IAEA Safeguards
Safeguard procedures consist of a system of records keeping,
reports, and on-site verification by international inspectors of the
accuracy of the records kept and reports rendered. The develop-
ment of detailed safeguard procedures, based on the general principles
contained in the IAEA Statute, has kept pace-barely-with progress
in the development of an international nuclear market. In 1960
detailed procedures were agreed upon for small research reactors.
In 1963 the system was extended to reactors of unlimited size, includ-
ing power reactors. At that time, the Soviet Union reversed its
previous position and lined up with the United States and other
Western nations in favor of an effective system of safeguards for IAEA
to administer.
In 1964-65 a comprehensive review was undertaken which re-
sulted in some simplification and clarification of the system without
compromising its integrity. Moreover, the process of review and
reassessment which took place may have helped to increase under-
standing of the purpose and effect of safeguards by some of those
nations who have been reluctant in the past to accept the principle
and necessity of such a system of international regulation. In
September 1965, the revised system, which applies primarily to
nuclear materials when they are being used in reactors, was put into
effect.
In June 1966, the IAEA Board of Governors provisionally ap-
proved special nuclear reactor fuels as they are sent through chemical
processing plants. These safeguards would apply both to plants
which are permanently under safeguards because they were con-
structed with Agency assistance or have been voluntarily submitted
to its control, and also to plants which are temporarily subject to
control while safeguarded nuclear material is passing through them.
This is a critical step to check, because it is here that the plutonium
produced in reactor fuels is separated from unburned uranium and
radioactive waste materials.
In order for a safeguard system to be comprehensive, further
detailed procedures will be needed for other points in the nuclear fuel
cycle, such as fuel element fabrication plants and, ultimately, plants
for increasing the concentration of the fissionable isotope U235 in
uranium. The technology involved in the latter process is one of
the few areas of information bearing on the civil uses of nuclear
energy which remains classified.
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Applications of Safeguards
IAEA safeguards must be applied to all nuclear assistance ob-
tained through the IAEA itself. Agency safeguards may also be
applied to nuclear assistance given by one member to another under
a bilateral agreement, on request of the states concerned, and to
any nuclear project in any country on request of that country.
Utilization of the IAEA as the instrument for administration of
safeguards on civil nuclear industries has increased markedly. This
can be largely attributed to the U.S. policy, firmly adopted in 1962,
of transferring to the IAEA the responsibility of safeguards with
respect to its bilateral agreements for cooperation in the civil uses
of the nuclear energy.
The United States had incorporated a peaceful uses guarantee
coupled with the right to verify compliance with the guarantee into its
bilateral agreements, most of which were concluded before the IAEA
system of safeguards was developed. Originally, the provisions for
safeguards were administered by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.
As the respective expiration dates of its bilateral agreements have
approached, the United States has insisted as a condition of renewal
that the recipient country agree to IAEA inspection of the nuclear
projects assisted under the agreements.
An exception to this policy exists in the case of bilateral agree-
ments with Euratom member states which have been permitted
to expire. The cooperative projects themselves have been continued,
however, within the framework of the U.S. agreement for coopera-
tion with Euratom under which the United States has agreed to
Euratom's assuming the responsibilities of safeguards.
Under trilateral safeguards transfer agreements the IAEA had,
as of September 1966, agreed to assume safeguards responsibilities
with respect to fourteen U.S. bilaterals (with Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Brazil, China, Greece, Iran, Israel, Japan, Norway, Philip-
pines, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, and Viet-Nam);
two United Kingdom bilaterals (with Denmark and Japan); and
one Canadian bilateral (with Japan). The United States had also
voluntarily placed four of its own reactor facilities under IAEA
safeguards, including one privately owned power reactor, and the
United Kingdom had similarly placed two of its power reactors at
the same location under safeguards. In addition, the IAEA had
agreed to administer safeguards on nuclear projects in eight coun-
tries which had obtained assistance through the Agency itself, rather
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than directly from a supplier nation (Argentina, Congo [Leopold-
ville], Finland, Mexico, Norway, Pakistan, Uruguay, and Yugo-
slavia). Furthermore, Canada, a country which is among those
having the largest known uranium reserves, declared in June 1965
that it would make no future sales of uranium without a peaceful uses
guarantee and some appropriate verification measures.
Finally, Dr. Seaborg, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Com-
mission, announced in March 1966 that the first commercial chemi-
cal processing plant to be built in the United States will be open
to IAEA inspectors as necessary for safeguarding the irradiated fuels
from the power reactor presently subject to IAEA safeguards in
the United States as the fuel elements are reprocessed, probably in the
fall of 1966.
The U.S. nuclear industry has thus far readily accepted the neces-
sity of, and indeed welcomed the application of, safeguards to its
facilities when requested to do so by the AEC. It is believed that
the U.S. utility industry, accustomed to external regulations and
conscious of the value of sound public relations, would have less
difficulty in accepting international inspectors than nuclear industries
in some other countries which do not necessarily exist in a similar
operational environment of openness to public scrutiny.
Acceptance of safeguards on a few U.S. nuclear facilities has not
had a significant direct impact on the non-proliferation problem
since the quantities of safeguarded nuclear materials in the United
States, although substantial in absolute terms, are insignificant when
compared with the size of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Never-
theless, implementation of safeguards in the United States has demon-
strated that the procedures involved neither interfere with the eco-
nomic operation of nuclear power reactors, nor result in disclosure
of commercial secrets. Moreover, such a demonstration may serve
to undercut vague notions articulated by some governments that
acceptance of safeguards infringes national sovereignty.
Since 1963 the Soviet Union has supported the development of
a strong system of safeguards procedures by the IAEA. The Soviet
Union has thus far, however, not requested the IAEA to administer
safeguards either with respect to any of its bilateral nuclear assistance
agreements or any of its own civil nuclear facilities, despite repeated
urgings from the U.S.
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Future problem areas
Looking to the future, three broad problem areas are discernible.
The first is economic. The world market for nuclear materials
and equipment is expanding. The requirement for safeguards as
a condition of export of nuclear materials or equipment is presently
a matter of policy left up to each individual nation to decide. As
the number of sellers and buyers in the nuclear marketplace increases,
the temptation for one seller to bargain away safeguards in order
to make a sale will increase and perhaps become irresistible.
In these circumstances it is imperative that a common under-
standing be reached among nuclear exporters to require safeguards
so that this item will be taken off the commercial bargaining table.
Due to the complexity of the nuclear market and number of coun-
tries involved, a centralized system of administration is necessary.
Although the IAEA would appear to be a logical focus of adminis-
trative responsibility, this may not prove politically acceptable if
the recipients of nuclear materials and equipment, who are also
members of the IAEA, believe that the suppliers are thereby con-
verting the IAEA into an instrument to be used against their interests.
Moreover, given the manifold pressures and divergent interests, such
a common understanding will probably not be workable on a long
run basis unless it is formalized in an international agreement.
The second problem area is technological. We are moving from
a period of scarcity to one of temporary overabundance of plutonium.
The commercial demands for plutonium will increase substantially
when breeder reactors, which produce more fissionable material than
they consume, become practicable. However, the breeder concept
implies both the production and utilization of huge quantities of
plutonium. On the other hand, relatively small quantities of this
material are sufficient for a militarily significant weapons stockpile.
In these circumstances, the problem of the technical accuracy and
allowable margin of error of any system of accountability and control
will become acute. A two or three percent diversion rate from
a large chemical processing plant, if undetected by an international
safeguards system, could have substantial military significance.
Therefore, as the amounts of nuclear materials involved are increased,
the accepted operating tolerance in a safeguards system must be
lowered and the efficiency of the system refined.
The third major problem area is political. Safeguards must be
accepted on a comprehensive basis by countries without nuclear
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weapons capabilities. Not only nuclear projects built with imports,
but also nuclear facilities built out of entirely indigenous resources
must be safeguarded if the outside world is to have assurance that
the civil nuclear industry in a country does not cover a clandestine
military aspect. This requires non-nuclear countries to believe that
voluntary submission of their "home grown" nuclear industries to
international inspection is in their national interest. Such a reversal
in existing national attitudes in many non-nuclear countries can only
be brought about if all countries cooperate. This would include a
willingness on the part of nations already possessing nuclear weapons
to undertake certain restraints with respect to their own nuclear
arsenals. Thus, the problem of safeguards is inseparable from much
broader security issues. Comprehensive international safeguards
regulation of civil nuclear industry will be accepted only when,
as, and if progress in other ways of preventing nuclear proliferation
is achieved.
The necessary legal machinery in this area is reasonably well
developed. But the economic and technological forces at work give
us a relatively short time to achieve the necessary political break-
throughs.
M. The Current Status of International Conventions on Civil
Liability for Nuclear Damage
As indicated in the introduction to this article, the international
aspects of civil liability for nuclear damage have given rise to the
preparation of several multilateral conventions on the subject. The
Paris Convention and the Brussels Convention supplementary thereto,
which were sponsored by the western European countries, and the
Vienna Convention which was sponsored by the International Atomic
Energy Agency which is world-wide in scope, all have to do with
land-based reactors. The Brussels Convention on Nuclear Ships
is concerned with the liability of operators of nuclear-powered vessels
on the high seas. In addition, an Inter-American convention on land-
based reactors is in process of preparation.
The Paris Convention and an additional protocol thereto probably
will be in force by the end of 1966. Apparently the effective date
of the other conventions is somewhat farther away.
The Paris Convention
The Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of
Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960 was prepared under the auspices
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of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
and was signed by sixteen European countries.7 The Convention
comes into force upon ratification by five signatories and is open to
accession by any Member or Associate country of the OECD. The
main principles of the Convention are:
( 1 ) Absolute and exclusive liability-without proof of fault--of
the operator of the nuclear installation concerned.
(2) A very limited right of recourse by the operator against
others.
(3) Limitation of liability in time (in principle 10 years from
the date of the nuclear incident).
(4) Limit of liability in amount (normally $15 million-may
be set higher or lower, but not below $5 million).
(5) Obligation of the operator to cover his liability by insurance
or otherwise.
(6) One court-that of the place where the incident occurs-
competent for all claims arising out of the same incident, with obliga-
tory enforcement of its judgments in all countries party to the
Convention.
Subsequently an Additional Protocol was prepared which was
designed to eliminate possible discrepancies with the Vienna Con-
vention of 1963 (discussed below). As of September, 1966, Belgium,
France, Spain, and the United Kingdom had ratified both the basic
Convention and the Additional Protocol. Turkey had ratified the
basic Convention and, it seemed likely, would ratify the Protocol
in the near future. The ratification procedure was fairly well advanced
in Belgium.
The Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention
The Brussels Supplementary Convention of 31 January 1963 was
designed to provide a system of financial protection which is in
addition to that required under the Paris Convention. Under the
Supplementary Convention, compensation for damage is to be pro-
vided up to 120 million European Monetary Agreement units of
7 Austria Italy Sweden
Belgium Luxembourg Switzerland
Denmark Netherlands Turkey
France Norway United Kingdom
Germany F.R. Portugal
Greece Spain
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account.' Up to an amount of at least 5 million units of account,
this compensation is to be provided out of funds provided by insur-
ance or other financial security, the amount to be established by the
legislation of the party in whose territory the nuclear installation of
the operator liable is situated. Between this amount and 70 million
units of account, compensation is to be provided out of public funds
to be made available by the party in whose territory the installation
is situated. Between 70 million and 120 million units of account,
compensation is to be provided out of public funds to be contributed
by the parties according to a formula which is based in part on the
gross national product of the parties to the Convention and in part
on the thermal power of the nuclear reactors installed in each country.
As in the case of the Paris Convention, an Additional Protocol was
prepared to conform the Brussels Supplementary Convention to the
Vienna Convention.
The Brussels Supplementary Convention comes into force upon
deposit of six ratifications. Thus far it has been ratified by France,
Spain, and the United Kingdom. The date upon which the Con-
vention will become effective is still uncertain.
The Vienna Convention
The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage
of 21 May 1963 is a world-wide convention which was prepared
under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Its
provisions are, in general, similar to those of the Paris Convention.
The Vienna Convention was signed by eight countries.' It comes
into effect upon ratification by five signatories and as of September
1966, there had been three ratifications.'" In addition, it is open to
accession by any member of the United Nations or of any of the
specialized agencies of or the IAEA not represented at the conference.
Thus far Cameroon, Trinidad, and Tobago have acceded to the
Convention.
The Brussels Nuclear Ship Convention
The Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear
Ships of 25 May 1962 was prepared by the International Maritime
8 A European Monetary Agreement unit of account is the equivalent of one
U.S. dollar.
9 China, Colombia, Cuba, Philippines, Spain, United Arab Republic, United
Kingdom, and Yugoslavia.
10 Cuba, Philippines, and United Arab Republic.
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Committee and was adopted at a diplomatic conference which met at
the joint invitation of the Belgian Government and the International
Atomic Energy Agency. The Convention applies to both merchant
ships and warships equipped with a nuclear power plant and operated,
or the operation of which is authorized, by countries which are party
to the Convention. The basic principles of the Convention are:
( 1 ) Absolute and exclusive liability-without proof of fault-of
the operator of the nuclear ship concerned.
(2) A very limited right of recourse by the operator against
others.
(3) Limitation of liability to a period of ten years from the date
of the incident, except as this may be extended by the licensing
state with a corresponding extension of financial protection.
(4) Limit of liability in amount ($100 million).
(5) Obligation of the operator to cover his liability by insurance
or otherwise.
(6) Option of the claimant to bring his action for nuclear
damages either in the courts of the licensing state or the courts of the
country party to the Convention in which the damage was sustained.
The Convention comes into force after ratification by at least one
licensing State (i.e., a State which operates or authorizes the opera-
tion of a nuclear ship) and one other State. It was signed at Brussels
by 14 countries 11 but as yet no country has ratified it.
At the mid-winter meeting in 1965, the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association adopted a resolution favoring U.S. ad-
herence to the Brussels Nuclear Ship Convention.
The Draft Inter-American Conventions
For some time the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission
(IANEC) has had under consideration the desirability of preparing
an Inter-American regional convention on civil liability for nuclear
damage. At the Fifth Meeting of IANEC, held in Valparaiso, Chile,
in March 1964, the Special Legal Committee on Civil Liability in
the Field of Nuclear Energy submitted a report to the Commission
which included alternative drafts of such a convention. One draft
would supplement the Vienna Convention by adopting certain varia-
11 Belgium Korea Philippines
China Liberia Portugal
India Malaysia United Arab Republic
Indonesia Monaco Yugoslavia
Ireland Panama
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tions and additions to it in a manner foreseen by that Convention itself.
The other draft would constitute a complete and autonomous text,
as far as possible compatible with the Vienna Convention and reflect-
ing many of its provisions.
The Commission resolved to submit both drafts to the member
states of the OAS for their comments, and requested the Special
Legal Committee to prepare a further report, with a view to the con-
vening of an Inter-American specialized conference for the purpose
of drafting and approving a definitive text of an Inter-American con-
vention on the subject. A number of countries have submitted com-
ments on the two drafts, and it was expected that the Special Legal
Committee would meet again in the latter part of 1966 to consider the
matter further. At the present time, it appears likely that the final
draft will take the form of a convention supplementary to the Vienna
Convention rather than an autonomous text.
IV. The Proposed Philippine Atomic Energy Legislation
Background for Development of the Legislation
The first United Nations project designed to develop an optimum
power program for a developing country which included considera-
tion of the prospects of using nuclear power was begun in the Philip-
pines in 1964 and will soon be completed. Entitled "Pre-Investment
Study on Power, Including Nuclear Power, In Luzon," the study is a
United Nations special fund project for which the International
Atomic Energy Agency is the executing body. The final project re-
port was expected to be published in mid-1966.
The study was divided into two phases: Phase A, completed early
in 1965, consisted primarily of an evaluation of local fossil and hydro-
electric energy resources and an estimate of local demand. Phase B
was designed to analyze various means for expanding the Luzon power
production capability in order to arrive at an optimum power pro-
gram, and to draw economic comparisons applicable to Luzon for
the early 1970's between fossil fuel and nuclear power stations.
Phase B also included (1) a study of financial problems likely to
be encountered in expanding the Luzon power grid and the ability of
Luzon utilities to raise the necessary capital; (2) preliminary investiga-
tions of possible suitable sites for nuclear plants; and (3) an analysis
of organizational and training activities which would be necessary
adjuncts to a nuclear power program. In addition, phase B included
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(4) the preparation of necessary draft legislation to establish a legal
framework for a nuclear power program.
Although the study was concerned with the Luzon power grid, the
sponsors of the study hope that the approach and methods developed
for carrying it out would be useful in doing similar studies in other
countries. Similarly, it is hoped that the pattern of legislation de-
veloped for the Philippines could prove to be useful as a basis for
similar laws in other countries.
The draft Philippine legislation prepared in phase B of the study
was designed (1) to establish a regulatory program over atomic
energy materials and facilities to protect the public health and safety
and the national interest; (2) to provide solutions to meet the prob-
lems of liability, insurance, and indemnity consistent with trends in
national legislation in other countries and with international conven-
tions; and (3) to provide an appropriate basis to fulfill the inter-
national obligations of the Philippines concerning atomic energy,
including the IAEA safeguards system.
The Regulatory Provisions of the Bill
In order to achieve the flexibility needed to accommodate a long-
range, comprehensive atomic energy program, the bill vests broad
regulatory discretion in the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission.
It creates the two categories of "atomic energy facility" and "atomic
energy material," and authorizes the Commission to establish regula-
tions applicable to such facilities and materials in order to protect the
health and safety of workers and the public, and to protect the na-
tional interest. The Commission is, in addition, authorized to require
that persons who wish to possess atomic energy facilities and materials
must obtain a license from the Commission. The Commission is also
authorized to make inspections and to revoke or suspend licenses to
assure compliance with its requirements.
"Atomic energy facility" is defined as meaning any equipment or
device which the Commission determines to be capable of producing
or utilizing atomic energy material in such quantity or manner as
may be significant to the national interest or to the health and safety
of the public.
"Atomic energy material" is defined in the law as meaning "source
material," "special fissionable material," and any other radioactive
material. Hence, the Commission can apply the regulatory require-
ments of the law to any material which is radioactive, regardless of
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whether the material is naturally radioactive or is made radioactive in
a nuclear reactor or a particle accelerator.
The Commission is also authorized, but not required, to establish
requirements for licensing the individual operators (i.e., individuals
who manipulate important controls) of atomic energy facilities of
kinds designated by the Commission.
In all cases of applications for licenses to construct and operate an
atomic energy facility, the Commission is required to issue a provi-
sional license initially, if it determines that there is reasonable assur-
ance that the proposed installation can be constructed and operated
without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. When the
final design of the facility, its construction, and procedures for its oper-
ation have been found to be adequate, the Commission may convert
the provisional license to an operating license.
The law vests in the Commission preferential rights to acquire any
special fissionable material owned by private persons in the Philip-
pines if the Commission believes that the development of atomic energy
or the national interest so requires; the acquisition must be made for a
fair and reasonable price. The law does not, however, require that
title to all fissile material be in the Philippine Government.
The bill includes appropriate procedural requirements with re-
spect to the issuance, or failure to issue, amendment, suspension, and
revocation of licenses. It also includes provisions for judicial review
of Commission orders. These procedural requirements, together with
certain other provisions included in the law with respect to hearings,
are designed to assure that the Commission's administrative procedures
will be fair and in accordance with the due process requirements of
the Philippine Constitution.
The Commission is directed, in the administration of the regula-
tory program, to impose the minimum requirements consistent with
its obligations to protect public health and safety and to promote the
national interest.
Liability, Insurance, and Indemnity for Nuclear Damage
The provisions of the bill regarding liability for nuclear damage,
financial security, and indemnity are based upon the Vienna Con-
vention. In order to conform closely to the provisions and objectives
of the Vienna Convention, the bill uses the definitions and text of the
Vienna Convention to a very large extent.
Like the Vienna Convention, the liability and indemnity provi-
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sions of the Philippine law are designed to accomplish the following
principal objectives, among others: (1) to channel exclusive and abso-
lute liability to the operator of the nuclear installation causing damage;
(2) to limit the operator's rights of recourse against others; (3) to
limit the aggregate liability of the operator; (4) to assure the avail-
ability of funds from commercial insurance and government funds,
when necessary, to pay claims within the maximum limits estab-
lished; and (5) to establish an appropriate prescription period. 2
Like the Vienna Convention, the Philippine law applies to (1)
nuclear reactors and nuclear fuel or radioactive products or waste
therein, except reactors used as a source of power in a means of sea or
air transport; (2) factories using nuclear fuel for the production of
nuclear material and factories for the processing or reprocessing of
nuclear materials; (3) facilities where nuclear material is stored;
(4) nuclear material coming from, originating in or sent to a nuclear
installation.
The limit on liability specified in the Philippine bill is $5 million,
the smallest limit on liability which is acceptable under the Vienna
Convention. The Vienna Convention minimum limit on liability was
incorporated as a temporary provision pending further discussions
with the Philippine and overseas insurance companies and further
study by them as to the maximum amount of insurance which they
could make available.
The discussions with representatives of Philippine insurance com-
panies during the course of drafting the bill identified the problems
which may be faced by many developing countries in assembling
insurance capacity to provide liability and property insurance cover
for nuclear facilities and activities. The discussions identified also
the probable dependence, at least initially, of insurance companies
in developing countries upon insurance companies in other countries
and the world insurance market to assemble the necessary under-
writing capacity.
Regulatory Authority to Implement International Agreements
As noted above, the bill recognizes two basic regulatory objec-
tives: protection of the public health and safety, and protection of the
national interest. The latter phrase corresponds in general usage to the
"common defense and security" objectives of the regulatory provisions
12 These objectives are shared also by the Paris Convention and the draft
Inter-American Conventions which have been previously discussed.
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of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. As declared
in the Philippine draft bill:
The production and use of atomic energy facilities and atomic
energy materials shall be subject to control by the State in order
to . . . assure fulfillment of the international obligations of the
State, to protect the health and safety of workers and of the
general public, and to protect against the use of such facilities
and materials for unauthorized purposes.
In general, the regulatory and licensing controls which would be
vested in the Philippine AEC in order to protect the public health
and safety could also be exercised to protect the "national interest."
Thus, the licensing and regulatory authority could be used by the
Philippine AEC to assure fulfillment of the Philippine's safeguards
obligations.
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